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The United Kingdom (UK) has left the 
European Union (EU) on 31 January 
2020.1 Although the UK and the EU 
concluded a Withdrawal Agreement2 
(WA), to this date (early October 2020), 
no new agreement has been concluded 
which would allow the UK access to 
Europe’s single market, the European 
Economic Area (EEA), of which also 
Norway and Iceland are members.3 
Between the end of the UK’s EU 
membership and the end of the 
transition period on 31 December 2020, 
the United Kingdom is a non-EU 
member of the EEA as the EEA 
Agreement4 applies to the UK by virtue 
of Article 129 paragraph 1 WA,5 
according to which, “during the 
transition period, the United Kingdom 
shall be bound by the obligations 
stemming from the international 
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agreements concluded by the Union, by 
Member States acting on its behalf, or by 
the Union and its Member States acting 
jointly”.6 Although the current 
construction provides the UK with 
single market access, the UK 
government has already announced that 
it does not intend to continue EEA 
membership beyond 31 December 2020. 
At this time, it looks increasingly likely 
that the current UK government is going 
to let the transition period run out 
without securing an agreement with the 
European Union. The withdrawal 
agreement between the EU and the UK 
only outlined the process towards an 
agreement concerning the future 
relationship between the EU and the UK. 
Allowing only eleven months for the 
creation of such an agreement seemed 
ambitious at best and it appears 
questionable whether the UK 
government ever had the intention of 
actually using the transition period for 
the negotiation of a new agreement. The 
UK’s Internal Market Bill is in express 
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violation of the withdrawal agreement 
and places UK law over international 
law, a stunning move away from the 
classical position at least in English law7 
that “the law of nations is per se part of 
the law of the land”,8 an idea which is 
still reflected the American legal 
system,9 for example in Article VI 
sentence 2 of the constitution of the 
United States of America.10 The EU has 
already reacted to the flagrant violation 
of international law by the UK which the 
Internal Market Bill poses and it appears 
likely that this will remain a source of 
tension for the foreseeable future. At 
least for the timing being, it appears as if 
the current British government has not 
only decided to in favour of a hard Brexit 
and to not use the transition period, but 
that it has also abandoned respect for 
international law, including its prime 
maxime, pacta sunt servanda. This makes 
it significantly more difficult for other 
states to muster the trust necessary for 
bona fide trade negotiations.  
The Arctic, especially the European 
Arctic, has close economic connections 
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with the European Union. Sweden and 
Finland are full members, Greenland 
and Faroyar, although not EU members, 
are part of the Danish realm and closely 
connected to the mainland, which is an 
EU member, Norway and Iceland are, as 
mentioned, members of the EEA, and 
Canada has concluded a free trade 
agreement with the European Union, the 
Comprehensive Economic and Trade 
Agreement11 (CETA), which is at least in 
part provisionally in force.12 While a free 
trade agreement between the EU and the 
United States of America might become 
a possibility depending on the outcome 
of the elections in the United States in 
November 2020, the economic relations 
between the EU and the Russian 
Federation are currently put on ice due 
to the ongoing war Russia is waging 
against Ukraine, which has led to 
sanctions and counter-sanctions 
between the West, including the EU, and 
the Russian Federation. This has direct 
implications for cross-border commerce, 
for example between the Finnish region 
of Lapland and Russia’s Murmask 
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oblast. For many people living in the 
European high north, the EU’s outer 
border between Norway and Sweden / 
Finland, on the other hand, has been 
virtually non-existent for generations. 
While different regulatory systems 
impact daily life across Sápmi, the 
personal and cultural connections across 
borders are often as important or even 
more important than those within a 
country. For a long time, European 
integration had the practical effect that 
borders became less and less relevant, 
following the model of integration 
between the Nordic countries. With 
Brexit, not only the threat of a hard 
border on the island of Ireland (which 
would be in violation of the Good Friday 
Agreement13) but also borders between 
Britain and the countries of the 
(European) Arctic would return. 
With regard to trade negotiations with 
Arctic nations, the disregard for 
international law exhibited by the 
current British government will provide 
a significant obstacle. Yet, close 
connections to the Arctic are not 
insignificant for the UK. The United 
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Kingdom has a long history of engaging 
with the Arctic, ranging from 
exploration of the icy top of the world 
and the exploitation of living marine 
resources to scientific research and 
modern-day tourism which brings large 
numbers of British tourists to the 
European Arctic during the winter 
months. The economic connections 
between the United Kingdom and 
especially nearby nations such as 
Iceland, Norway and Faroyar are 
significant, yet so far the UK only has 
managed to conclude a free trade deal 
with the latter, or, more precisely, with 
Denmark, which is reflected in the title 
of the agreement, the Agreement 
establishing a Free Trade Agreement 
between the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland and the 
Kingdom of Denmark in respect of the 
Faroe Islands.14 An agreement had been 
concluded with Norway and Iceland,15 
but it never entered into force as it was 
seen only as a fallback in the event of a 
no deal-Brexit.16 With the entry into force 
of the UK-EU Withdrawal Agreement, 
that agreement became moot.17 What 
was not envisaged in the agreement with 
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Norway and Iceland was that a British 
government would conclude a 
withdrawal agreement with the 
European Union and then fail to honor 
it. A truly hard Brexit will have negative 
economic consequences for both the UK 
and the member states of the EEA. It 
looks ever more likely that international 
trade law rules under the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) system will 
become relevant between the UK and 
Arctic nations.  
While short stays, e.g. for touristic 
purposes, will likely be possible visa free 
after 31 December 2020, the practical 
realities of travel to europe for UK 
citizens will change significantly after 
the that date18 (in addition to, of course, 
the impact of the ongoing COVID-19 
pandemic on international travel). Even 
though the UK was not a party to the 
Schengen Agreement,19 travel between 
the continent and the UK was relatively 
easy pre-Brexit. While the impact on 
tourism might still be limited, although 
the travel experience is unlikely to be as 
smooth as in the past, the lack of a clear 
legal regime is likely to impact scientific 
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and economic cooperation, to name just 
two examples.  
With regard to the Arctic, Britain’s 
disregard for international law raises 
questions in how far the United 
Kingdom remains a reliable partner for 
cooperation because international 
cooperation in the Arctic relies heavily 
on the use of international law. Non-
Arctic states which wish to cooperate 
with Arctic nations will have to find 
their place within the international legal 
framework in order to facilitate such an 
engagement - for example through the 
United Nations Convention on the Law 
of the Sea,20 by seeking observer status at 
the Arctic Council21 or through bilateral 
agreements, such as the recent fisheries 
agreement between Norway and the 
UK.22 Abandoning respect for 
international law as a matter of principle 
essentially closes the door to 
international cooperation. Even serious 
political differences have been overcome 
to facilitate cooperation in the Arctic, but 
always on the basis of international law, 
even if the norms created under the 
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auspices of, for example, the Arctic 
Council, are of a limited material scope.  
A hard Brexit will impact the 
relationship between the United 
Kingdom in many ways. It will be 
detrimental to the economic relationship 
between the UK and Arctic nations, 
although the free trade agreement 
between the UK and Faroyar and the 
fisheries agreement between the UK and 
Norway might be indicators of how 
future developments could look like. 
This, however, requires that other states, 
and especially the European Union, are 
willing to conclude agreements with the 
United Kingdom. Unless the UK 
government is able to counteract the 
impression that it has no regard for 
international law, a key tool for 
international cooperation in the Arctic, it 
risks that Britain is no longer perceived 
as a reliable partner. In the long run, this 
lack of trust might impact British-Arctic 
relations more than the absence of free 
trade agreements and the need to fall 
back on WTO rules.  
 
